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I. INTRODUCTION 
Myanmar is the only Asian country that comes up in almost 
every list of countries recruiting child soldiers globally.1 Since the 
country’s independence in 1948, it has been politically unstable and 
has engaged in civil conflict. As a result, the Myanmar National Army 
(Tatmadaw) and almost all of the Burmese ethnic groups have 
systematically recruited child soldiers.2 Besides the government 
forces, ethnic militias like the Karen National Liberation Army, the 
Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Shan State Army (SSA), and 
the Ta’ang National Liberation Army in the Burmese states of 
Kachin, Kayin, and Shan are major recruiters of child soldiers.3 
In 2002, Human Rights Watch released a report, My Gun was 
as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma, that put forth some shocking 
statistics, calling Myanmar the largest country in the world that 
recruited child soldiers.4 According to the report, Myanmar had 
70,000 child soldiers under the age of 18.5 Those 70,000 child soldiers 
make up 20% of the total active-duty soldiers in the country.6 Among 
the ethnic-based militias, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) is the 
biggest recruiter with approximately 2,000 soldiers under 18 and 600-
800 of them under 15.7 The Kachin Independence Army is the only 
                                                 
 1 Jared Ferrie, Five countries where child soldiers are still recruited, IRIN NEWS 
(May 17, 2016), http://www.irinnews.org/news/2016/05/17/five-countries-
where-child-soldiers-are-still-recruited; Meghan Werft, 7 countries using child 
soldiers, GLOBAL CITIZEN (February 12, 2016), https://www.globalcitizen. 
org/en/content/7-countries-that-still-use-child-soldiers/. 
 2 IMAGE ASIA, NO CHILDHOOD AT ALL A REPORT ABOUT CHILD 
SOLDIERS IN BURMA [8] (Thailand Images Asia 1997). 
 3 U.N. Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. 
A/70/836-S/2016/360 (Apr. 20, 016). 
 4 Pau Khan Kau Hangzo, Resolving Internal Conflict in Myanmar: A Human 
Security Approach, CENTRE FOR NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY STUDIES (May 2009), 
http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/nts/resources/nts-insight/NTS%20Insight%20May 
%202009.1.pdf. 
 5 Kevin Heppner, My Gun was Tall as me: Child Soldiers in Burma 106, 226, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2002), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/burma 
/Burma0902.pdf. 
 6 Hangzo, supra note 4, at 3. 
 7 Heppner, supra note 5, at 7. 
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group that recruits girl soldiers under 18, mostly forcefully.8 Both the 
government and ethnic militias have policies against recruiting 
children yet they continue to recruit using special procedures.9 There 
is a gap between their commitments and actual practices. 
Despite understanding the causes, effects, and rationality 
behind the use of child soldiers, the situation in Myanmar has 
remained unchanged. This comment argues that, in order to end 
child-soldiering, the government must solve the socio-economic and 
political issues of the country, which are the causes behind it. Political 
measures include bringing the regions, governed by differing ethnic 
groups, under the purview of the central government, so that the 
child soldiers in their armies can be rescued. Second, bringing the 
military under the government command, to ensure that malpractices 
by the military leaders do not go unpunished. 
This comment begins with a brief introduction of the issue of 
child soldiers in Myanmar. Section two of the comment is a 
discussion of the political actors in the country and the definitions of 
a child soldier. Different governments and treaties have used 
different definitions and this comment provides an overview of these 
definitions. This section also explores the development of Myanmar’s 
society. It delves into how civil conflict and political instability have 
been a major cause of child soldiering. Section three begins with a 
discussion on what can be done to solve the issue of political 
instability. This is followed by an analysis of the unrestrained power 
of the Burmese military and its connection to the proliferation of 
child soldiering. Again, the section identifies the options available to 
the new government to bring its military under civilian control. 
Section four deals with the development of the international law 
applicable to child soldering and why it has proved to be unsuccessful 
in the case of Myanmar has been examined. It will explore the 
limitations of international law on the prohibition of underage 
recruitment, and the subsequent criminal charges against those 
military officials involved in that recruitment. 
                                                 
 8 Id. 
 9 Burma: World’s Highest Number of Child Soldiers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Oct. 16, 2002), https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/10/16/burma-worlds-highest-
number-child-soldiers. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. Major Political Actors 
The national military came to power after the coup of 1962. 
It replaced the civilian government and imposed martial law10 that 
was in effect till 1974.11 This period saw significant expansion in the 
role of military in the national economy, politics, and state 
bureaucracy. In 1988, another coup brought the military back to 
power which formed a government called the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC).12 SLORC remained in power till 2011 
when it was dissolved.13 The military became a very powerful 
institution in the country after being in power for almost 50 years 
since independence.14 In 2011, it transferred the power to the Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). 
The USDP was formed in 2010 and was primarily used as a 
political platform for many of the country’s former military leaders. It 
was headed by former president, Thein Sein and won more than 75% 
of the votes in the 2010 elections, which were largely considered to 
be flawed.15 The party only won 8% of the votes in the 2015 elections 
                                                 
 10 Martial law is defined as military control over all of a country’s activities, 
usually during wartime or due to an emergency or widespread disaster. 
 11 In 1974, the military transferred the power to an elected government, 
formed by a single party – the Burma Socialist Programme Party. This was a hybrid 
government between the military and the civilians. See generally, Konsam Shakila 
Devi, Myanmar under the Military Rule 1962-1988, INT’L RES. J. OF SOC. SCI. (Oct. 
2014), http://www.isca.in/IJSS/Archive/v3/i10/8.ISCA-IRJSS-2014-173.pdf. 
 12 Nehginpao Kipgen, Burma’s 8888: A Movement That Lives on, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nehginpao-kipgen/burmas-
8888_b_3723013.html (last visited Oct.3, 2016). 
 13 Associated Press in Naypyitaw, Burma junta disbanded as ‘civilian’ government 
sworn in, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world 
/2011/mar/30/burma-civilian-governmnet-junta-disbanded. 
 14 During its rule, the military has done more bad than good for the 
country. Scott Mathieson, Burma’s Military Milestone, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 
30, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/30/burmas-military-milestone. 
 15 The United States and the European Union criticized the military leaders 
and dismissed the elections for not being free or fair. According to these western 
powers, the elections did not meet the internationally accepted standards. The 
voters complained that they were not allowed to vote in private and many state 
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and is said to be undergoing major changes before the 2020 
elections.16 
The National League for Democracy (NLD) was formed in 
1988 under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. The Party won 59% 
of the votes in the 1990 elections but the military regime did not 
allow the Party to form the government, repressed it instead, and 
placed Suu Kyi under house arrest. Further, the Party boycotted the 
2010 elections because some of its prominent leaders were not 
allowed to contest the elections. NLD re-registered and ran for the 
2015 elections, which it won by a landslide victory. 
The six major ethnic groups in Myanmar are the Arakanese, 
Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, and Mon. Each of these groups 
have their share of grievances against Tatmadaw. In addition, these 
groups also have their own states and armed groups.17 These groups 
have been fighting the military government since 1962 for not 
implementing the Panglong Agreement of 1947, which guaranteed 
the groups: regional autonomy under a federal governing structure, 
                                                 
employees had been forced to vote for the military in advance. Similarly, the United 
Nations claimed that the citizens do not have the freedom of expression or 
associations. It doubted the legitimacy of these elections. Trevor Wilson, The 
Significance of Myanmar’s 2010 elections, NEW MANDALA (Dec. 15, 2010), 
http://www.newmandala.org/the-significance-of-myanmar%E2%80%99s-2010-
election/. 
 16 Ei EI Toe Lwin, USDP looks to rebound from 2015 election drubbing, THE 
MYANMAR TIMES (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-
news/nay-pyi-taw/22075-usdp-looks-to-rebound-from-2015-election-
drubbing.html. 
 17 Arakan (aka Rahkine) State: Arakan Liberation Army (ALA) and the 
Arakan Army (AA). Chin State: Chin National Army (CNA). Kachin State: Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA) Shan State: Kachin Independence Army (KIA), United 
Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA Mongla), 
Shan State Army - South (SSA - S), Shan State Army - North (SSA - N), Wa 
National Army (WNA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), 
Lahu Democratic Front (LDF), Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF), and the 
Pa’O Peoples Liberation Army (PPLA). Karenni (aka Kayah) State: Karenni Army 
(KnA) and the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP). Karen (aka Kayin) State: Karen 
National Defense Organization/Karen National Liberation Army 
(KNDO/KNLA) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). Mon 
State: Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA). 
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right to self-determination, religious freedom, and ethnic minority 
rights.18 
Tatmadaw, the two major political parties (USDP and NLD) 
and the armed ethnic groups are the major political players in the 
politics of Myanmar. They have dominated the political scene for 
decades and the continuous quandary between them has been the 
origin of internal conflict in the country. 
B. Definitions 
The Paris Principles on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict 200719 defines a child soldier as “any person below 
18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used by an 
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited 
to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies or 
for sexual purposes.”20 
Definitions by scholars differ based on whether they consider 
child soldiering to be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary child 
soldiering is defined when “children, particularly those orphaned or 
disconnected from civil society, may volunteer to join any group if 
they believe that this is the only way to guarantee regular meals, 
clothing or medical attention.”21 However, Ingunn Bjorkhaug, a 
researcher with the Fafo Foundation, argues that child soldiering is 
never voluntary in a real sense i.e. it is “voluntarily forced” as 
                                                 
 18 Panglong Agreement of 1947, UNITED NATIONS PEACEMAKER (Feb. 12, 
1947), http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MM_470212_Pan 
glon%20Agreement.pdf. 
 19 The Paris Principles were adopted in Paris in February 2007 
demonstrate the strengthened international resolve to prevent the recruitment and 
abuse of children. It also highlights the actions governments should take to protect 
the children affected by conflict. The Paris Principles are the operational guidelines 
regarding the sustainable reintegration of children formerly associated with the 
armed groups. 
 20 UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The Paris Principles, (Feb. 2007), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/465198442.html. 
 21 PETER W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 62 (Pantheon Books, 1st ed. 
2005). 
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children may not have any other option but to join armed groups.22 
In the case of Myanmar, both voluntary23 and involuntary24 soldiering 
is evident. However, regardless of the way the children are recruited, 
they are abused and become victims of violence. A few scholars 
argue that the child soldiers sometimes kill or torture members of 
their own community. In doing so, they can even become 
perpetrators themselves.25 
C. Development of Myanmar’s Society 
Over the years, researchers have established that the primary 
causes of the increase in recruitment and use of child soldiers can be 
attributed to the following factors: the presence of civil conflict/war, 
political instability, and strong indoctrination by army and insurgent 
groups.26 In the case of Myanmar, the two major causes of child 
soldiering are ongoing ethnic conflicts and political instability.27 
These factors create an environment in which businesses and schools 
cannot function causing other factors such as poverty, illiteracy, 
unemployment, ideological influences, and culture to be the 
secondary causes of child soldiering. 
The ethnic-based groups have been at loggerheads with each 
other and the government since independence in 1948. The civil 
                                                 
 22 KAI CHEN, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHILD SOLDIERING ON 
MYANMAR-CHINA BORDER 18 (Springer 2014). 
 23 Human Rights Watch, Sold to be Soldiers 16, 136, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Oct. 31, 2007), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/burma1007/burma1007webw 
cover.pdf. 
 24 Id. at 7. 
 25 Vaha argues in her paper Victims or Perpetrators: Child Soldiers and the 
vacuum of responsibility that child soldiers between the ages of 15 to 18 years are moral 
agents with specific responsibilities for their roles as soldiers and so they should be 
considered morally responsible combatants as well. The child soldier with an armed 
group is not only a ‘child’ but also a ‘soldier’ with combatant duties. This fact 
should not be ignored when dealing with child soldiers. See generally Milla Vaha, 
Victims or Perpetrators: Child Soldiers and the vacuum of responsibility, ISA’s 50th 
ANNUAL CONVENTION, New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, 
2014, 11-30 from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p312482_index.html. 
 26 See generally RACHEL BRETT & IRMA SPECHT, YOUNG SOLDIERS: WHY 
THEY CHOOSE TO FIGHT (Lynne Rienner 2004). 
 27 CHEN, supra note 22, at 19. 
2018 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 6:1 
378 
conflict between the government and at least one of the 15 different 
ethnic groups has been ensuing for 60 years, making it the world’s 
longest running civil war.28 Some ethnic groups, like the UWSA, 
signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1989, were 
given autonomy in their region, and allowed to maintain their armed 
forces.29 However, other groups like the KIA are still fighting for 
autonomy under a democratic federal union.30 
The central government has no control over the political, 
military, and economic activities undertaken by the ethnic groups in 
their autonomous regions, especially in the case of UWSA.31 This has 
also affected the quality of education and employment opportunities 
for the children in these regions. They have no option but to go to 
schools operated by the ethnic militias. Although the ethnic groups 
like KIA and UWSA fund and operate schools in their regions, the 
education is highly biased and propagandized. For instance, ethnic 
nationalism is entrenched in the KIA funded education system.32 
Moreover, these schools also include pre-military training in their 
curriculum.33 
According to the interview conducted by Child Soldiers 
International, most of the children have voluntarily joined the KIA-
funded schools and want to work as KIA civil servants. However, 
there are still many children who would rather join KIA’s 
                                                 
 28 Ivan Watson, Javed Iqbal, & Manny Maung, Myanmar’s hidden war, CNN 
(Nov. 11, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/11/asia/myanmar-shan-
rebels-civil-war/. 
 29 David Brunnstrom, Myanmar Ethnic Leaders Reject Drug Accusations, 
REUTERS (Apr. 28, 1999), http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives 
/199904/msg00420.html; Aung Naing Oo, Wa Ceasefire Haunts the Burmese Military, 
THE NATION (Apr. 30, 1999), http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives 
/199904/msg00448.html. 
 30 Nehginpao Kipgen, Address Kachin Problem Politically, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nehginpao-kipgen/kachin-
burma-conflict_b_2480290.html. 
 31 Yun Sun, The UWSA and the Peace Process, STIMSON CENTER (Aug. 10, 
2016), https://www.stimson.org/content/uwsa-and-peace-process. 
 32 Child Soldiers International, A Dangerous Refuge: Ongoing child recruitment by 
the Kachin Independence Army 14, 38, (2015), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid 
/55a4e7194.pdf. 
 33 CHEN, supra note 22, at 24; Id. 
2018 Child Soldiers in Myanmar 6:1 
379 
revolutionary movement. This originates from the teachings, by KIA, 
regarding historical grievances and injustice committed by the 
Burmese government forces.34 These grievances have developed 
from events such as the failure of the Panglong Agreement of 1947,35 
forced to transform KIA’s armed groups into Border Guard Force 
under control of Tatmadaw, hostile actions by the government 
towards KIA in 2010 followed by major assault in 2011 and 
perpetration of widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity 
against the Kachin civilian population.36 Children are taught how the 
government has committed injustice towards their people and why it 
is necessary to take arms.37 Thus, the indoctrination process the 
children undergo in their schools and society must be stopped for 
child soldiering to come to an end. However, in order to do this, the 
central government will have to devise new power-sharing 
agreements wherein they can supervise the socio-economic systems 
in the insurgent-controlled areas. Through these systems the 
government can ensure that the children receive primary education 
and that the working age population has employment opportunities. 
If the problems of illiteracy and unemployment are solved in this 
manner then less children will join KIA. 
Wessells, based on his extensive work on impacts of war on 
children, argues that societal systems that provide food, water, 
                                                 
 34 Child Soldiers International, supra note 32, at 15. 
 35 The Panglong Agreement of 1947, was reached at Panglong in the Shan 
states in Burma between the Shan, Kachin and Chin ethnic minority leaders and 
Aung San, head of the interim Burmese government. The agreement accepted “Full 
Autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas” in principle and 
envisioned the creation of Kachin State by the Constituent Assembly. However, 
the government failed to fulfill its promise of equitable distribution of resources 
between Myanmar’s dominant Bamar group and the ethnically marginalized 
communities which has been the root cause of the long, violent civil conflict in the 
country. 
 36 Human Rights violations by the Burmese Army includes attacks against 
civilian populations, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and 
detention, land confiscations, recruitment of child soldiers and forced labor and 
portending. This has caused large scale internal displacement with entire villages 
forced to displace. See Burma’s Covered up War: Atrocities Against the Kachin People, 
OXFORD BURMA ALLIANCE, http://www.oxfordburmaalliance.org/uploads/9/1 
/8/4/9184764/kwat-report-book-1.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2018) at 8. 
 37 Child Soldiers International, supra note 32, at 12. 
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education, and healthcare to children are largely affected by war. As a 
consequence, children consider armed groups to be their only way to 
access these basic necessities.38 This is the case with the Burmese 
children who live with armed groups for food, shelter and 
protection.39 Similarly, there were cases of child soldiers joining the 
Tatmadaw only because it provided them two meals a day.40 
The rise of the military regime in the 1960s and its 
consolidation of power after the 1988 protests was the beginning of 
widespread poverty and malnourishment in Myanmar.41 In 1990, the 
United States (U.S.) and the European Union (E.U.) imposed 
sanctions against Myanmar after the military regime refused to 
transfer the power to the democratic government that won the 
elections.42 The political effectiveness of these sanctions is still 
debated and there is no evidence that it was the sanction that led to 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s victory last year.43 The negative impact of the 
sanctions, on the other hand, can clearly be seen from its abysmal 
performance on the Human Development Index.44 Take for instance, 
the garment industry which relied on the exports to the U.S. When 
the industry was closed after the sanctions, almost 60,000 jobs were 
                                                 
 38 MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO 
PROTECTION 44 (Harvard University Press 2006). 
 39 Child Soldiers International, Chance for Change: Ending the recruitment and 
use of child soldiers in Myanmar 31, (Jan. 2013), http://www.burmalibrary.org 
/docs14/CSI-myanmar_chance_for_change.pdf. 
 40 Heppner, supra note 5, at 183. 
 41 Alison Vicary & Sean Turnell, Sanction on Burma have a role to play, THE 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (AU) (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.smh.com.au 
/federal-politics/political-opinion/sanctions-on-burma-have-a-role-to-play-
20091005-gjaz.html. 
 42 European Commission, The EU’s relations with Burma/Myanmar 2, --, 
(Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents 
/fd/dase20050419_003/dase20050419_003en.pdf.; Byron Tau & Carol Lee, U.S. to 
End Economic Sanctions against Myanmar, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www. 
wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-end-economic-sanctions-against-myanmar-1473874082. 
 43 Hillary Benn, Look at the sanctions on Burma, NETWORK MYANMAR (Feb. 
25, 2016), http://www.networkmyanmar.org/sanctions. 
 44 Paul Vrieze, UN Ranks Burma among 3 Least Developed Asian Nations, THE 
IRRAWADDY (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/un-ranks-burma-
among-3-least-developed-asian-nations.html. 
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lost and poverty and associated social problems increased.45 
Furthermore, as unemployment increased, household income for the 
majority of the workers declined, and families struggled to meet their 
nutritional needs. It is estimated that 44% of children in Myanmar 
suffered from malnourishment nationwide.46 
At present, 25.6% of the Burmese population lives below the 
national poverty line, which is the highest among all the Southeast 
Asian countries.47 Although Myanmar’s growth rate has been about 
7% and Foreign Direct Investment (F.D.I.) is expected to increase to 
$100 billion in the next two decades, none of this development is 
reaching the ordinary citizens, especially those living the rural areas.48 
Poverty is largely concentrated in the rural regions of the 
country.49 The main causes of rural poverty include lack of assets 
(land)50 and unorganized labor.51 Revenues from the sale of the 
natural resources are not directed towards rural development but 
instead fill the pockets of the military leaders and their crony 
companies.52 This can be seen in the case of water, gemstones, oil 
and gas, and timber. Moreover, due to lack of agricultural land, 
income generation options are very limited. In addition, government 
schools in rural areas are mostly closed, leaving the rural children 
                                                 
 45 Gabriel Andreasson, Evaluating the effects of economic sanctions against Burma, 
LUO STUDENT PAPERS 3, (2008), https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/ 
publication/1335119. 
 46 TED RALL, WAKE UP, YOU’RE LIBERAL!: HOW WE CAN TAKE AMERICA 
BACK FROM THE RIGHT 289 (Soft Skull Press 2004). 
 47 Poverty in Myanmar Basic 2016 Statistics, ASIAN DEV. BANK (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.adb.org/countries/myanmar/poverty#tabs-0-2. 
 48 David Steinberg, Reexamining Growth and Poverty in Myanmar, ASIA 
FOUND. (June 25, 2014), http://asiafoundation.org/2014/06/25/reexamining-
growth-and-poverty-in-myanmar/. 
 49 Nikolas Win Myint, Growing together: Reducing Rural Poverty in Myanmar, 
THE WORLD BANK (May 9, 2016), http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/ 
growing-together-reducing-rural-poverty-in-myanmar. 
 50 Anu Seth, Myanmar – The Rural-Urban Divide, MYANMAR INSIDER (Sept., 
2014), http://www.myanmarinsider.com/myanmar-the-rural-urban-divide/. 
 51 Christina Cho, Poverty in Myanmar, THE BORGEN PROJECT (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://borgenproject.org/poverty-myanmar/. 
 52 Global Witness, Jade: Myanmar’s “Big State Secret”, (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/myanmarjade/. 
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without education.53 These children are then forced by the soldiers, 
or lured by the salary, to join the national army.54 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Political Stability 
Needless to say, the new government needs to develop 
poverty reduction strategies. One way of doing this is by regulating 
the sale of the natural resources. Revenue generated from the sale of 
the resources should be used for the development of the rural 
population. For instance, 90% of the hydroelectricity generated from 
the Myitsone dam was to be transferred to China while 84% of 
Burmese rural population would have lived in dark.55 The 
government must reconsider such deals. The partnership between the 
military leaders, Chinese businesses, and ethnic leaders must be 
broken or they should be required to pay a certain percentage of their 
revenues towards local development. 
One step in the direction of political stability is to bring all 
the stakeholders – the government, military, and ethnic groups – 
together with the aim of stopping all forms of skirmishes between 
them. In 2015, eight out of the fifteen ethnic groups signed the 
National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the Government of 
Myanmar.56 This was achieved after two years of negotiations.57 The 
NCA is a peace-building agreement dealing with ceasefires, their 
implementation, monitoring, and political dialogues between the 
                                                 
 53 Heppner, supra note 5, at 24. 
 54 Id. at 37. 
 55 Rachel Harvey, Burma dam: Why Myitsone plan is being halted, BBC (Sept. 
30, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15123833; Yu Jincui, 
Chinese firms seek to restart suspended projects after Myanmar’s transition, GLOBAL TIMES 
(Apr. 21, 2016), http://www. globaltimes.cn/content/979575.shtml. 
 56 Trevor Wilson, Is Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement good enough?, 
EAST ASIA FORUM (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/21/is-
myanmars-nationwide-ceasefire-agreement-good-enough/. 
 57 Myanmar signs peace deal with armed groups, BBC (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34536002. 
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government and the ethnic groups.58 But the legitimacy of the NCA 
is being questioned after realizing that the most powerful ethnic 
groups - UWSA, SSA and KIA - did not sign it.59 
Myanmar-expert, Bertil Lintner, called the entire peace 
process by the government of President Thein Sein flawed because it 
created more problems than it has solved.60 He argues that the 
conflict has intensified during President Sein’s government against 
KIA, SSA, and MNDAA in Kokang. In contrast, Jack Myint, 
Myanmar political and business analyst, believes that “NCA is a step 
in the right direction” because now peace exists in at least some parts 
of the country.61 
For now, signing the NCA can wait. Instead, the military 
should stop its offensives against KIA and SSA along with its efforts 
to take back its territories. It should focus on building peace and trust 
with these ethnic groups which is critical for any political dialogue to 
take place. These groups have been fighting for their autonomy for 
almost five decades and took up arms because the government did 
not fulfill their promise to grant them autonomy.62 The distrust is 
deep-rooted and therefore the government needs to accept that these 
groups will neither surrender their arms nor their autonomy at this 
point. Therefore, the government should propose that the ethnic 
groups be given autonomy only if they agree to immediately release 
all the child soldiers and permit international bodies to conduct 
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annual audits to check that these armies no longer recruit child 
soldiers. Considering that autonomy is so crucial for these groups, 
this could influence and persuade them to end the use of child 
soldiers. Alternatively, with the issue of autonomy on the table, these 
groups will at least participate in the negotiations. 
The next step would be to establish some mechanism 
wherein the groups can manage their territories but permit the 
government to overlook certain matters related to social and 
economic development of its people. This would include the 
regulation of school curriculums in their regions, implementing 
poverty and unemployment reduction policies, monitoring the 
discharge process of child soldiers and their reintegration in the 
civilian society. However, as recommended by the Human Rights 
Watch, it needs to be ensured that this education is non-military in 
nature and unrelated to military service.63 
The ethnic groups will not likely accept these changes unless 
the government offers something in return. The government should 
offer assurance that all ethnic groups will have freedom to practice 
their religion such as: Islam in Arakan state, and Christianity in Chin 
and Kachin states. Likewise, their schools will be permitted to teach 
ethnic languages, which was earlier restricted by the military.64 
Although these may seem like small steps to the world at large, the 
main goal of these ethnic groups is the preservation of their cultures, 
traditions, and languages.65 It is why they have demanded autonomy 
and taken up arms.66 Therefore, the government must be willing to 
reach a compromise with the ethnic groups. 
B. Military under Civilian Control 
After 1988, the Burmese Army pursued a program of rapid 
expansion to maintain a stronger hold over the country, with the aim 
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of recruiting 7,000 soldiers per month. This was the time when the 
army began forcefully conscripting children in large numbers to meet 
their recruitment quota.67 In 2004, the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC) established the Committee for Prevention of 
Military Recruitment of Underage Children.68 Since then, the 
committee has only focused on proving the claims of child 
recruitment false.69 
The culture of impunity is evident in the military for all types 
of human rights violations.70 The complaint mechanisms are said to 
be limited and the military is unwilling to discuss it.71 The military has 
also created a fear among the people by harassing them. As a result, 
people prefer not to report their children’s forced conscription. In 
2015, it was reported that 277 servicemen, including 50 officers, were 
punished for recruiting child soldiers.72 But there is no further details 
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regarding “what” punishment they received or if there are more such 
officers awaiting trial.73 
The military has emerged as and continues to be the most 
powerful organization in Myanmar’s political arena.74 In 2015, Aung 
San Suu Kyi and her party won a landslide victory. It is the first 
democratic government the country has seen in the last five 
decades.75 However, important departments like Home Affairs, 
Defense, and Border Affairs are still under the control of the military. 
The 2008 constitution adds to the military’s illegitimate power by 
allowing the military certain freedoms like to waive habeas corpus for 
people it considers to be a threat to their national security or to use 
forced labor.76 
The military has ensured that it does not completely lose its 
power to the new civilian government.77 It is too strong for the 
government to make any decisions regarding its functioning. The 
government, as a result, has no means to keep checks-and-balances 
regarding recruitment of child soldiers. Efforts thus, need to be made 
                                                 
 73 Nick Baker, Tatmadaw discharges 68 former child soldiers, THE MYANMAR 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news 
/22445-tatmadaw-discharges-68-former-child-soldiers.html; US: Return Burma, Iraq 
to child soldier list, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 26, 2017), https://www.hrw.org 
/news/2017/06/26/us-return-burma-iraq-child-soldier-list. 
 74 Vinod Anand, The Role of Myanmar’s Military in Democratic Transition and 
Implications for India, VIVEKANANDA INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION 3, 26, (Dec. 
2013), http://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/the-role-of-myanmar-s-military-
in-democratic-transition-and-implications-for-india.pdf. 
 75 50 years of military rule over in Myanmar, CBS NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/myanmar-burma-htin-kyaw-first-president-new-
democracy/. 
 76 Jon Emont, Can Myanmar’s new government control its military?, THE NEW 
YORKER (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/can-
myanmars-new-government-control-its-military. 
 77 There are many reasons why the military will not cede all its power. The 
military sees itself as the protector of the country’s security and unity in face of the 
ongoing ethnic insurgencies. Once out of power, they can face prosecution. The 
military also has heavy investments in various projects around the country, which 
can come under jeopardy. Rupakjyoti Borah, Tough Choices in Myanmar as a new era 
begins (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/tough-
choices-myanmar-era-begins-160331085859440.html. 
2018 Child Soldiers in Myanmar 6:1 
387 
to reduce the powers of the military along with bringing it under the 
control of the democratic civilian government. 
In order to bring Tatmadaw under the new government 
command, the 2008 military-created constitution will have to be 
amended. This is almost impossible because 25% of the seats are 
reserved for the military and more than 75% of votes in parliament 
are needed for passing an amendment.78 But, Aung San Suu Kyi has 
vowed to amend the constitution to make it more democratic.79 
According to U Ko Ni, a prominent human rights lawyer in 
Myanmar and NLD party’s longtime adviser, who was shot recently, 
Suu Kyi can hold a national referendum to show the military that 
people of the country want a new constitution.80 Amendment to the 
constitution is therefore, of utmost importance if Suu Kyi hopes to 
see a change in the attitude of the military and ultimately, the end of 
the culture of impunity prevalent therein. 
C. International Law for Child Soldiers 
International law dealing with child soldiers has developed 
over the last several decades. Two Additional Protocols to the 
Geneva Convention of 1949 were adopted in 1977 which dealt with 
the application of international humanitarian law to the civilians 
caught up in internal conflict.81 In 1989, the Convention on the 
Rights of Children (CRC) was adopted, which guarantees the rights 
of children during peacetime, as well as in the situation of armed 
conflict.82 It came into force in September 1990 and has been ratified 
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by 196 countries.83 In May 2000, two Optional Protocols to the CRC 
were adopted by the UN.84 The First Protocol prohibited the 
involvement of children under the age of 15 in military conflicts85 and 
the Second Protocol disallowed child trafficking, pornography, and 
prostitution.86 
The Rome Statute, adopted in 1998, made the practice of 
conscripting, enlisting, or using children under age of fifteen in 
hostilities a war crime.87 This applies to both government-controlled 
armed forces and non-state armed forces. It is also the treaty that 
established the International Criminal Court (ICC).88 At present, 
there are 139 signatories and 124 ratifications to the statue. However, 
Myanmar has not acceded to it.89 This was followed by the 
International Labor Organization’s Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention (Convention 182) in 1999.90 It prohibits the forced 
recruitment of children under the age of eighteen for use in armed 
conflict.91 
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In general, international humanitarian law applies to both 
international conflicts and non-international conflicts. However, 
these organizations rely on the hierarchical structures of the state and 
the military command for the implementation of the law. Thus, the 
success of the implementation depends on the existence of a military 
chain of command and a strong desire from within the organization 
to comply with international law obligations.92 This raises the 
question of who is responsible when there is breach of international 
law in a failed state. Thurer, an international law scholar, argues that 
although the legal capacity of the State continues to exist, it cannot be 
held responsible for not having prevented offences. This is because 
the State does not have the necessary power to act.93 
In such a scenario, where the judiciary has collapsed, 
international organizations like the United Nations or the ICC can 
step in to prosecute and punish individuals committing crimes. In 
recent years, this has been made possible through the establishment 
of ad hoc tribunals, for instance, in Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda 
(1994).94 These tribunals are the first international tribunals to hold 
high-profile leaders like Rwandan Prime Minister, Yugoslav 
President, and leaders of Bosnian Serbs accountable for their 
crimes.95 However, ad hoc tribunals are considered to be inconsistent 
in their accountability of the violations of international criminal law, 
are expensive especially for poor countries, which should be utilizing 
all their monetary resources on national building instead of spending 
it on tribunals, and these tribunals are also believed to exacerbate 
tensions rather than promote reconciliation.96 
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1. International law and the Case of Myanmar 
Myanmar has been on the Fragile State Index97 (FSI) – previously 
known as the Failed State Index, from 2006 to 2011. Figure 1, in the 
proceeding appendix, shows that the level of state-based conflict 
deteriorated from 2007 to 2009. It began improving in 2010 but  
Source: Fund for Peace98 
beginning in 2015, the ratings have again begun to go up again i.e., 
the society and institutions are increasingly vulnerable to failure. The 
FSI is calculated by considering various social, economic, and 
political indicators.99 As a result, understanding them is crucial 
because they illustrate the bigger picture of a society and political 
system in a country. States that recruit child soldiers are more often 
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than not, categorized failed states.100 If the Burmese government 
takes measures to improve its scores on these indicators, it will be 
able to solve the issue of child soldiering, at least to some extent. 
Failed states recruit child soldiers to use them as defense in 
intra-state counter-insurgency.101 This is evident in the case of 
Tatmadaw as well as the ethnic groups. As discussed above, both of 
these entities have been engaged in conflicts with the ethnic groups 
and need a strong, large force to maintain their control. Widespread 
unemployment and poverty has pushed many children be a part of 
the ethnic militia; many others are kidnapped and forced to serve in 
the army.102 
Moreover, failed states do not have access to the free global 
economy, they fund their wars through illegal means.103 For instance, 
the ethnic groups are engaged in large-scale illegal drug trade to fund 
their operations and buy weaponry. The Tatmadaw on the other hand, 
engages in shoddy deals with Chinese and Thai companies to earn 
their revenues because international sanctions have stopped the 
international businesses from investing in the country.104 
The FSI highlights one of international law’s major limitation: 
implementation. Ad hoc tribunals and the Joint Action Plan are 
examples of how international law is dealing with the child soldiers in 
Myanmar but are producing limited effects. Since international 
legislations and moral arguments do not have an impact on rebel 
groups and failed states,105 ad hoc tribunals can be a way of 
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investigating the crimes committed by Burmese warlords and military 
officials for recruiting child soldiers. Although the effectiveness of 
these tribunals is highly debated, it is still better than no activity on 
the part of the international community.106 The objective behind 
setting-up a tribunal is crucial in a country like Myanmar where no 
crime related to child soldiering or violence (in general) has been 
punished. Even if a single warlord is punished or only a few military 
officials are charged, it will set a precedent of how recruiting child 
soldiers is unacceptable. Similarly, these cases can act as deterrence if 
the international community and the citizens believe that these 
criminal proceeding are fair.107 
The Joint Action Plan is another attempt to deal with child 
soldiers but has shown limited results. The Government of Myanmar 
and the United Nations signed it in 2012 “to prevent the recruitment 
and use of children by its armed forces”.108 Under the Action Plan, 
the government will have to work towards the discharge of children 
and their rehabilitation and reintegration into civilian life.109 As per 
the implementation plan, all the under-age recruits were supposed to 
be released over a period of 18 months and Country Task Force on 
Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) was to ensure that there was no 
more recruiting. In addition, the government and CTFMR had 
planned to establish monitoring mechanisms to allow access to bases, 
personnel, and documentation verification.110 Since then, 745 children 
have been released by the army and the government has implemented 
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steps to reinforce age assessment procedures within the centralized 
military recruitment process.111 However, there are problems with the 
identification of the recruited children, especially the ones with armed 
groups which are outside the purview of the governing bodies. 
Although the Tatmadaw and the armed groups have official 
policies prohibiting underage recruitment, lack of safeguards, and 
accountability are the loopholes through which the recruitment 
continues.112 According to the report by Child Soldiers International, 
children continue to be recruited unlawfully by Tatmadaw and the 
armed groups. This is attributed to the failure to address 
accountability, continued falsification of age documents and coercing 
the children. Additionally, the legal procedures for investigation to 
prosecute military officials using and abetting recruitment of child 
soldiers are still unclear.113 
2. International Criminal Court 
The ICC declared child soldiering to be a war crime and has 
taken action to prosecute the recruiters in the past. Hence, examining 
its role in Myanmar’s context is crucial. The ICC is impartial and 
independent in its proceedings and has international jurisdiction over 
internal conflicts. However, in order to maintain state sovereignty, 
the ICC can only function where the State itself is unwilling or unable 
to carry out the prosecution.114 In 2014, the ICC convicted former 
Congolese militia leader, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for “conscripting 
and enlisting children under the age of 15 into his militia.”115 Through 
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his conviction, the ICC sent a message to the international 
community that such crimes would not go unpunished. Similarly, in 
2012, the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted former Liberian 
president, Charles Taylor for 11 war crimes including recruiting 
children under the age of 15 for combat. These two convictions are 
significant steps taken by the international justice system but, it also 
shows how judicial systems at the national level are failing to 
prosecute those involved in such crimes. 
In the case of Myanmar, will the military junta or the warlords 
of the ethnic armies ever be tried in such a tribunal? Likely not. This 
is because firstly, Myanmar is not a signatory to the Rome Statue.116 
And, as per Article 12 of the Rome Statute, the ICC cannot prosecute 
from the states that have never joined the court. The Security Council 
(UNSC) would have to give the ICC jurisdiction over these cases. 
Secondly, the ICC can open an investigation only when the issue is 
referred to them by the State party or the UN Security Council, or if 
it is authorized by the Pre-Trial chamber based on the information 
provided to them by individuals or NGOs.117 Even if the Security 
Council plans to do so, permanent members of the UNSC and close 
allies of the military junta – China and Russia – can veto this 
decision.118 
China and Russia’s actions on similar UNSC resolutions 
illustrates their likelihood to use their veto power. In January 2004, a 
resolution on Burma was put forward by the U.S., United Kingdom, 
and Northern Ireland. However, China and Russia vetoed it citing 
the following reasons: it was an internal matter of a sovereign state, 
situation was not a threat to international peace, and security and 
other bodies of the UN like the Human Rights Council should deal 
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with it.119 China and Russia would likely use the same explanation for 
a veto of a UNSC resolution, referring jurisdiction of Myanmar cases 
to the ICC. 
The ICC is considered to be the last resort for victims who 
no longer believe their national judicial system will give them 
justice.120 The international community likely still hopes that the 
Myanmar government and judiciary can prosecute the leaders of the 
military junta and warlords at the national level. The national 
legislations are required to give their domestic court jurisdiction over 
crimes listed in the Rome Statute if they do not want the ICC to 
interfere in their internal matters. Suu Kyi will have to work towards 
making this happen. 
Most importantly, child soldering has been an issue in Burma 
for more than two decades.121 But the Rome Statue came into force 
only in 2002.122 As a result, it can look into crimes that are committed 
only after 2002. In order to prosecute the perpetrators of pre-2002 
crimes, ad hoc tribunals will have to be created.123 Aung San Suu Kyi 
should not forget that the major reason for her popularity and 
widespread support is that the Burmese people believe she will 
ensure that justice prevails in the country. Therefore, Suu Kyi will 
have to take measures in that direction. This should include 
submitting to the jurisdiction of international law governing bodies. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Child soldering in Myanmar should not be seen as an isolated 
problem. It is an outcome of the larger socio-economic and political 
problems that the country faces. Hence, the government and the 
international organizations need to focus on solving the problems of 
poverty, unemployment, and political instability as discussed in the 
comment before child soldiering can be eliminated. 
The government should begin with fostering domestic peace. 
This begins first by ending the offensive against the rebel groups. 
The government should adopt a middle approach that maintains the 
regional autonomy of the ethnic groups and, at the same time, 
ensures that the central government is able to implement policies for 
the social and economic development of its citizens. Secondly, the 
government must reduce the powers of the military. The military has 
vested interests in the economic and political aspects of the country 
and after tremendous efforts has become the powerful institution 
that it is today. The military will not allow the government to 
undertake any measures that are detrimental to their interests and 
undermine their authority. Only after bringing the military under 
government oversight, can Suu Kyi work towards discharging the 
child soldiers. 
Finally, for international law to be successfully applicable to 
the children of the country, the Myanmar government must take 
measures to bring itself under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Similarly, 
the government can also request its allies, China and Russia, to 
support the UNSC resolution of giving the ICC jurisdiction over 
Myanmar cases. Although this may seem unlikely to happen, given 
the fact that both China and Russia themselves commit human rights 
violations, the new government should make an attempt to negotiate. 
International courts and treaties have been created to provide justice 
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to the victims of unspeakable crimes.124 It is thus, the responsibility of 
the national government to ensure that its citizens get that justice. 
 
                                                 
 124 Statement of ICC-Prosecutor at the Commencement of Trial in the case against 
Messrs. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Ble Goude, ICC-CPI (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www. 
icc-cpi.int /Pages /item.aspx?name=otp-stat-29-01-2016. 
